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I. INTRODUCTION
Since the end of the Cold War, fundamental changes in global governance,
power dynamics, and economic relations have led to a period of vigorous
structural and substantive growth in the arena of international law. Structurally,
this period has been marked by a proliferation of international courts and
tribunals. Substantively, we have seen the elucidation and development of many
areas of international law. These developments have increased the complexity of
international law and led to new challenges in various areas, including
international dispute resolution.
This Article addresses three of the hottest topics in international dispute
resolution. Part II focuses on reconciling international criminal justice with
domestic peace by exploring three case studies in Latin America, Africa, and
Europe, respectively. Part III discusses the perils of the fragmentation of
international law by examining how disparate courts interpret and apply the same
legal principles and instruments in competing ways. Part IV examines the
growing interface between the jurisprudence of domestic courts and international
courts and tribunals. Each of these issues can be attributed, in part, to this
structural and substantive growth in the sphere of international law.
II. HOT TOPIC 1: RECONCILING INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE AND
DOMESTIC PEACE
Countries undergoing transition, whether from repressive rule or recovering
from war, are often confronted with the need to address legacies fraught with
grave violations of international human rights and humanitarian law. It is only by
dealing with the past through addressing the root causes of violence in its various
forms and specifically addressing grievances that societies can reconcile
differences, move forward, and build a sustainable peace. Indeed, international
law requires states to investigate and prosecute gross violations of human rights
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and serious violations of international humanitarian law, to provide redress to
1
victims of those violations, and to take measures to prevent further violations.
There is no “one size fits all” method, however, for coming to terms with a
violent past. Rather, the most appropriate way forward for a particular society
will depend on a variety of context-specific, socio-political, economic, and
cultural factors. Toward this end, over the years, states have employed a variety
of measures, including the establishment of truth commissions; the enactment of
amnesty or lustration laws; the provision of reparations to victims; domestic
prosecutions of alleged perpetrators; traditional forms of justice, such as the
2
Gacaca courts established in response to the Rwandan genocide; or any
combination thereof. Furthermore, in the early 1990s, another transitional justice
tool emerged from the toolbox, after having lain dormant for nearly half a
century.
With the establishment of the ad hoc International Criminal Tribunals for the
Former Yugoslavia (“ICTY”) and Rwanda (“ICTR”), the hybrid criminal
tribunals, such as the Special Court for Sierra Leone (“SCSL”), the Special
Tribunal for Lebanon, and the Extraordinary Chambers of the Courts of
Cambodia (“ECCC”), and finally, the International Criminal Court (“ICC”), the
legacy of the post-World War II military tribunals at Nuremberg and Tokyo has
3
been revived. Criminal justice in the international arena has become a leading
means of seeking accountability for gross violations of human rights and serious
violations of international humanitarian law. For the past nineteen years, these
institutions have proven to be effective means of combating impunity, and,
furthermore, have made significant contributions to the elucidation and
development of international criminal and humanitarian law. Correspondingly,
the prosecution of internationally-condemned crimes in domestic jurisdictions
has gained increasing momentum.

1. See, e.g., Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Reparation for Victims of
Gross Violations of International Human Rights Law and Serious Violations of International Humanitarian
Law, G.A. Res. 60/147, U.N. Doc. A/RES/60/147 (Mar. 21 2006); see also Office of the U.N. High Comm’r for
Human Rights, Rule-of-Law Tools for Post-Conflict States: Reparations Programmes, at 5-6, U.N. Doc.
HR/PUB/08/1 (2008) (listing, inter alia, article 8 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, article 2 of the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and article 14 of the Convention against Torture and Other
Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment as international human rights instruments forming the
legal basis for a right to a remedy and reparation).
2. See Rwanda Killers Face Local Justice, BBC NEWS (Mar. 10, 2005, 12:59 PM), http://news.bbc.
co.uk/2/hi/africa/4335405.stm.
3. About the ICTY, UN ICTY, http://www.icty.org/sections/AbouttheICTY (last visited Dec. 8, 2012);
About ICTR, UN ICTR, http://www.unictr.org/AboutICTR/GeneralInformation/tabid/101/Default.aspx (last
visited Dec. 8, 2012); About the Special Court for Sierra Leone, UN SCSL, http://www.sc-sl.org/ABOUT/
tabid/70/Default.aspx (last visited Dec. 8, 2012); About the STL, STL, http://www.stl-tsl.org/en/about-the-stl
(last visited Dec. 8, 2012); About ECCC, UN ECCC, http://www.eccc.gov.kh/en/about-eccc (last visited Dec. 8,
2012); About the Court, ICC, http://www.icc-cpi.int/EN_Menus/ICC/About%20the%20Court/Pages/about%20
the%20court.aspx (last visited Dec. 8, 2012).
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However, this globalization of criminal justice has generated debate
regarding whether the aims of international criminal justice are always
reconcilable with, and conducive to, the pursuit of peace. This potential tension
between “justice” and “peace” is a paradox, given that a fundamental rationale
for holding persons accountable for crimes such as genocide, war crimes, and
crimes against humanity is to contribute to stability and peace by deterring future
atrocities, bringing justice to victims, and paving the way for the re-establishment
4
of the rule of law and reconciliation.
Yet, it is widely acknowledged that such efforts can also have negative
consequences—possibly generating instability and frustrating domestic efforts at
peace and reconciliation by, for example, opening old wounds, creating a
disincentive to negotiate peace, or interfering with traditional justice processes,
which may be considered more appropriate or effective, or both, in certain
contexts. This tension between justice and peace can be seen time and again as a
byproduct of international efforts to address the aftermath of gross violations of
international human rights and humanitarian law, and leads to the difficult
5
question of “if and when justice should take priority over peace.”
A. Pinochet in the House of Lords
Spain’s efforts to prosecute General Augusto Pinochet, the former Chilean
Head of State, under the principle of universal jurisdiction, and the divided
response to these efforts within Chilean society and among international leaders,
graphically raised precisely such questions regarding the compatibility of
international justice and domestic peace.
In 1973, General Pinochet seized power after the democratically elected
6
government of President Salvador Allende was overthrown by a military coup.
During General Pinochet’s seventeen-year regime, some 2,603 people are
7
reported to have been executed, tortured, or “disappeared.” In 1978, the Chilean
government passed an Amnesty Law, shielding from prosecution any persons
4. See, e.g., Payam Akhavan, Beyond Impunity: Can International Criminal Justice Prevent Future
Atrocities?, 95 AM. J. INT’L L. 7, 28 (2001); Sara Dareshori, Pursuing Peace in an Era of International Justice,
50 POLITORBIS 83 (2010), available at www.dplf.org/uploads/1292518783.pdf.
5. Nick Grono, Deputy President of the Int’l Crisis Group, Speech to the Overseas Development
Institute: Peace versus Justice? Understanding Transitional Justice in Fragile States (Oct. 9, 2009) (transcript
available at http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/publication-type/speeches/2009/the-role-of-international-justicemechanisms-in-fragile-states.aspx).
6. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, DISCREET PATH TO JUSTICE?: CHILE, THIRTY YEARS AFTER THE MILITARY
COUP 1 (2003), available at http://www.hrw.org/legacy/backgrounder/americas/chile/chile0903.pdf; Amnesty
Int’l, Chile: The Terrible Legacy of Augusto Pinochet, AI Index AMR 22/010/2004 (Sept. 9, 2004), available at
http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/AMR22/010/2004/en/cf781af9-d58e-11dd-bb24-1fb85fe8fa05/
amr220102004en.pdf; Frances Webber, The Pinochet Case: The Struggle for the Realization of Human Rights,
26 J. L. SOC’Y. 523, 524 (1999).
7. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 6, at 1; Amnesty Int’l, supra note 6; Webber, supra note 6, at
524.
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who committed crimes between 1973 and 1978. It was during that five-year
period, when Chile was ruled under a state of siege, that the vast majority of
9
human rights violations are alleged to have been committed. In 1989, the
Chilean people held free, democratic elections, and General Pinochet conceded
10
defeat to opposition leader, Patricio Aylwin. General Pinochet remained a
senator for life, however, which office provided him immunity from prosecution,
11
and he retained his position as commander-in-chief of the armed forces.
President Alwyn’s election initiated a period of transition, in which victims of
12
General Pinochet’s regime called for justice and demanded accountability.
However, elements of the former regime, including General Pinochet himself,
13
called on Chileans to forget the past as a means of moving forward. Pinochet
claimed, “It is best to remain silent and to forget. It is the only thing to do: we
must forget. And forgetting does not occur by opening cases, putting people in
14
jail.”
In 1991, the new government established a truth and reconciliation
commission (“TRC”) to document the crimes committed during General
15
Pinochet’s regime. However, the 1978 Amnesty Law prevented the TRC from
16
naming or prosecuting alleged perpetrators. Nevertheless, in 1998, General
Pinochet was arrested in London on the basis of an international arrest warrant
17
and request for extradition issued by an examining magistrate in Spain. Spain
sought to prosecute General Pinochet for his role in crimes against humanity
committed during his rule under a Spanish law authorizing the exercise of
18
universal jurisdiction.
8. The law does not distinguish between common crimes and human rights violations, and the only
exception to amnesty is for persons “implicated in the homicide and passport falsification case in relation to the
assassination of political activist Orlando Letelier” in Washington, D.C. Law No. 2.191, Abril 19, 1978, DIARIO
OFICIAL [D.O.] (Chile). See Avenues and Obstacles to Justice, MEMORIA Y JUSTICIA, http://www.memoriay
justicia.cl/english/en_avenues.html (last visited Nov. 25, 2012); Webber, supra note 6, at 529.
9. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 6, at 1, 4 n.2.
10. Background on Chile, CTR. FOR JUSTICE & ACCOUNTABILITY, http://www.cja.org/article.php?list=
type&type=196 (last visited Nov. 25, 2012); Webber, supra note 6, at 528, 529; Alfonso Serrano, Death of a
Dictator, CBS NEWS (Feb. 11, 2009), http://www.cbsnews.com/2100-215_162-2251475.html.
11. Background on Chile, supra note 10; Webber, supra note 6, at 529; Serrano, supra note 10.
12. Background on Chile, supra note 10.
13. Id.; Amnesty Int’l., supra note 6.
14. Background on Chile, supra note 10.
15. Id.
16. Id.; Amnesty Int’l., supra note 6.
17. Naomi Roht-Arriaza, Universal Jurisdiction: Myths, Realities, and Prospects: The Pinochet
Precedent and Universal Jurisdiction, 35 NEW ENG. L. REV. 311, 311 (2001); Frederic L. Kirgis, The Pinochet
Arrest and Possible Extradition to Spain, AM. SOC’Y OF INT’L LAW (Oct. 1998), http://www.asil.
org/insigh27.cfm.
18. Roht-Arriaza, supra note 17, at 311; Kirgis, supra, note 17; see David Sugarman, The Arrest of
Augusto Pinochet: Ten Years On, OPEN DEMOCRACY (Oct. 29, 2008), http://www.opendemocracy.net/article/
the-arrest-of-augusto-pinochet-ten-years-on (“[U]niversal jurisdiction permits a national court to try a person
suspected of a serious international crime even if neither the suspect nor the victim are nationals of the [forum
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Initially, the High Court of the United Kingdom found that General Pinochet
could not be extradited because, as a former Head of State, he was entitled to
19
state immunity in relation to the alleged crimes. However, in an unprecedented
20
decision, the House of Lords upheld the extradition, and found that General
Pinochet could not claim immunity for acts of torture committed after December
8, 1988, the date that the United Kingdom’s ratification of the Torture
21
Convention took effect. In reaching this decision, Lord Browne-Wilkinson cited
the ICTY Trial Judgment in the Furundžija case, which found that the
22
prohibition against torture is jus cogens, i.e. a peremptory norm.
In Chile, news of General Pinochet’s arrest and the House of Lords’ decision
was met with a mixed response, generating both pro-Pinochet demonstrations
23
and anti-Pinochet celebrations. The Chilean government considered the arrest
an interference with Chile’s judicial sovereignty and asserted that Chileans
24
should decide how to deal with General Pinochet. It even threatened to bring a
25
case against Spain before the International Court of Justice (“ICJ”). However,
victims of the Pinochet regime celebrated the arrest as an opportunity to finally
26
hold General Pinochet accountable for his crimes.
The response from the international community was also mixed. Former
British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher criticized the U.K. government for
sanctioning the case and claimed that General Pinochet would not get a fair trial
27
if extradited to Spain. The U.S. Department of State further expressed concern
28
that the arrest could upset Chile’s fragile democracy. However, the U.N. High

state], and the crime took place outside that [forum].”).
19. Andrea Bianchi, Immunity versus Human Rights: The Pinochet Case, 10 EUR. J. INT’L L. 237, 23940 (1999).
20. Regina v. Bartle and the Comm’r of Police for the Metropolis and Others, [1999] 2 All E.R. 97
(H.L.) (appeal taken from Eng.).
21. Bianchi, supra note 19, at 239-40.
22. He stated that even though none of the alleged conduct was committed by or against U.K. citizens,
the Torture Convention requires that torture is triable in the U.K. regardless of where it is committed. He further
stated that “International law provides that offences jus cogens may be punished by any state because the
offenders are ‘common enemies of all mankind and all nations have an equal interest in their apprehension and
prosecution.’” See Regina, [1999] 2 All E.R. 97 (H.L.) [8-9].
23. Chilean President Calls for Calm, BBC NEWS (Nov. 28, 1998, 9:04 AM), http://news.bbc.co.uk/
2/hi/americas/222238.stm; Joy and Anger at Pinochet Ruling, BBC NEWS (Nov. 25, 1998, 6:56 PM),
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/221936.stm.
24. Roht-Arriaza, supra note 17, at 315; Chilean President Calls for Calm, supra note 23; Joy and
Anger at Pinochet Ruling, supra note 23.
25. Pinochet Dispute for World Court, BBC NEWS (Sept. 15, 1999, 9:50 PM), http://news.bbc.co.uk/
2/hi/americas/448607.stm.
26. Chilean President Calls for Calm, supra note 23.
27. More specifically, Thatcher added that this was likely, “not least because the key witnesses for his
defence run the risk of immediate arrest if they set foot on Spanish soil.” See Thatcher Pleads Pinochet’s Case,
BBC NEWS (Oct. 6, 1999, 8:52 PM), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/politics/467114.stm.
28. E. Lawrence Barcella, Jr., Pursuing Pinochet: The Case We Made 22 Years Ago, TRANSNATIONAL
INST. (Dec. 6, 1998), http://www.tni.org/article/pursuing-pinochet-case-we-made-22-years-ago.
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Commissioner for Human Rights hailed the ruling as “a ringing endorsement that
29
torture is an international crime subject to universal jurisdiction.” Amnesty
International also supported General Pinochet’s extradition, stating that “[i]n the
absence of a state putting on trial one of its own people for crimes against
30
humanity, the obligations of the international community come into play.”
Ultimately, however, in March 2000, General Pinochet was allowed to return
to Chile after British authorities found that he was unfit to stand trial due to ill
31
health. Yet, the endeavor to hold General Pinochet accountable for his crimes
did not end there. Spain’s intervention had the unexpected consequence of
32
“opening the floodgates” to national prosecutions. When Pinochet returned to
Chile, the Supreme Court of Chile removed his immunity from prosecution under
Chilean law, and thereafter, over 177 complaints were brought against him for
33
alleged human rights violations committed during his rule. However, these
proceedings were also suspended on medical grounds, and to the dismay of
many, General Pinochet died in 2006 without having been tried or convicted for
34
any crime. Nevertheless, the indefinite suspension of General Pinochet’s case
did not prevent significant progress, since the time of his arrest, in holding other
35
persons to account for crimes committed during his regime.
General Pinochet ultimately evaded international criminal justice. However,
international intervention at a time when Chilean courts were either unable or
unwilling to act served as a catalyst for national prosecutions. Whether
international efforts to hold General Pinochet accountable brought justice to the
people of Chile, and in particular, the victims of his crimes and their loved ones,
is thus open to question.
B. The ICC Case Against Joseph Kony et al. and Prospects for Peace in
Northern Uganda
The situation in Northern Uganda provides another illustration of the
potential clash between international criminal justice efforts and the quest for

29. Straw Considers Pinochet Case, BBC NEWS (Mar. 25, 1999, 4:22 AM), http://news.bbc.co.uk/
2/hi/302487.stm.
30. Judges Re-run Pinochet Hearing, BBC NEWS (Jan. 18, 1999, 12:02 PM), http://news.bbc.co.uk/
2/hi/257228.stm.
31. Frederic L. Kirgis, Pinochet Arrest in Chile, AM. SOC’Y OF INT’L LAW (Dec. 2000),
http://www.asil.org/insigh58.cfm; Pinochet ‘Unfit to Face Trial’, BBC News (Jan. 12, 2000, 12:04 AM),
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/599526.stm.
32. Background on Chile, supra note 10; HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 6, at 5.
33. Kirgis, supra note 31; Pinochet Charged with Kidnapping, BBC NEWS (Dec. 1, 2000, 7:11 PM),
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/1050374.stm.
34. See, e.g, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 6, at 5; Chile Drops Pinochet Trial, BBC NEWS (July
1, 2002, 8:21 PM), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/2080500.stm; Chile’s Gen Pinochet Dies at 91, BBC
NEWS (Dec. 11, 2006, 12:53 AM), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/6167237.stm.
35. See generally HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 6.
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peace. Northern Uganda’s twenty-year conflict between rebel leader Joseph
Kony’s Lord’s Resistance Army (“LRA”) and the Ugandan government involved
36
a campaign of terror waged against the civilian population. Thousands of people
37
were killed, and some two million uprooted. The LRA, notorious for its
brutality, is alleged to have committed mass rape, murder, and mutilation of
civilians, and to have abducted tens of thousands of children to serve as
38
combatants and sex slaves. It is alleged that the Ugandan Army, rather than
protecting this vulnerable population, committed its own widespread abuses,
including forced displacement, killing, torture, rape, and arbitrary arrests and
39
detention.
The United Nations has described these events in Northern Uganda as “one
40
of the worst humanitarian crises in the world.” The scale of human suffering
41
resulting from the conflict created an equally pressing urgency to resolve it. As
a means of encouraging LRA fighters to surrender, the Ugandan government
enacted an Amnesty Act in 2000, which guaranteed that LRA fighters who put
42
down their weapons would be immune from prosecution. In 2003, unable to
apprehend LRA leaders, the government referred “The Situation Concerning the
43
Lord’s Resistance Army” to the Prosecutor of the ICC. In response, the
Prosecutor opened an investigation into the matter, and in 2005, issued five arrest
44
warrants against senior LRA leaders, including Kony.
The ICC’s indictments generated considerable concern within Northern
Ugandan society that the threat of ICC prosecution could derail the fragile peace
45
process and prolong the violence. Rather than resorting to retributive justice,
those who opposed ICC involvement generally preferred seeking to resolve the
36. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, UPROOTED AND FORGOTTEN: IMPUNITY AND HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES
available at http://www.hrw.org/reports/2005/09/19/uprooted-and-forgotten.
37. See id.
38. See generally id.; Michael Otim & Marieke Wierda, Uganda: Impact of the Rome Statute and the
International Criminal Court, INT’L CTR. FOR TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE 1-2 (May 2010), http://www.ictj.org/
sites/default/files/ICTJ-Uganda-Impact-ICC-2010-English.pdf; Amnesty Int’l, Left to Their Own Devices: The
Continued Suffering of Victims of the Conflict in Northern Uganda and the Need for Reparations, 5, AI Index
AFR 59/009/2008 (Nov. 17, 2008), available at http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/AFR59/009/
2008/en/55689934-af47-11dd-a845-0749a6f015c0/afr590092008en.pdf.
39. See generally HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 36; Otim & Wierda, supra note 38, at 1-2;
Amnesty Int’l, supra note 38.
40. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 36, at 13.
41. Otim & Wierda, supra note 38, at 2.
42. See CONCILIATION RES., COMING HOME: UNDERSTANDING WHY COMMANDERS OF THE LORD’S
RESISTANCE ARMY CHOOSE TO RETURN TO A CIVILIAN LIFE (2006), available at http://www.c-r.org/sites/cr.org/files/ComingHome_200605_ENG.pdf; see also Otim & Wierda, supra note 38, at 2.
43. Press Release, Int’l Criminal Court, President of Uganda Refers Situation Concerning the Lord’s
Resistance Army (LRA) to the ICC (Jan. 29, 2004), http://www.icc-cpi.int/menus/icc/press%20and%20media/
press%20releases/2004/president%20of%20uganda%20refers%20situation%20concerning%20the%20lord_s%
20resistance%20army%20_lra_%20to%20the%20icc?lan=en-GB; Otim & Wierda, supra note 38, at 2.
44. Otim & Wierda, supra note 38, at 2.
45. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 36, at 3.
IN NORTHERN UGANDA (2005),
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conflict through restorative means including dialogue, amnesties for LRA
46
members, and the reintegration of former combatants.
In June 2006, less than a year after the indictment of Kony and his
47
colleagues, the LRA entered into peace talks with the Ugandan government.
Over the next two years, numerous agreements were signed between the warring
parties, including a cessation of hostilities agreement in August 2006, which,
48
although breached on numerous occasions, led to a reduction in violence.
As a price for his purported cooperation, Kony repeatedly demanded that the
49
ICC withdraw the arrest warrants. Aware that the arrest warrants threatened to
derail discussions that could lead to peace, but with no legal avenue available to
50
it to compel withdrawal of the warrants, the Ugandan government entered into
an agreement with the LRA in February 2008 to establish a War Crimes Division
in the High Court of Uganda, so that alleged perpetrators could be tried
51
nationally. The agreement also provided for the pursuit of justice through
52
traditional mechanisms. With the establishment of this War Crimes Division,
Uganda could potentially challenge the admissibility of the ICC case against
53
Kony under Article 19 of the Rome Statute. The Ugandan government further
promised the rebels that once the final peace agreement was signed, it would seek
a deferral of the ICC prosecution from the UN Security Council under Article 16
46. Id.; Otim & Wierda, supra note 38, at 2.
47. Otim & Wierda, supra note 38, at 3.
48. See generally INT’L CRISIS GRP., NORTHERN UGANDA: THE ROAD TO PEACE, WITH OR WITHOUT
KONY 11 (2008), available at http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/africa/horn-of-africa/uganda/
Northern%20Uganda%20The%20Road%20to%20Peace%20with%20or%20without%20Kony.pdf; see also
INT’L CRISIS GRP., PEACE IN NORTHERN UGANDA? 1-5 (2006), http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/
africa/horn-of-africa/uganda/B041%20Peace%20in%20Northern%20Uganda.pdf.
49. INT’L CRISIS GRP., PEACE IN NORTHERN UGANDA?, supra note 48, at 15.
50. As party to the Rome Statute establishing the ICC, the Ugandan government is obliged to cooperate
with the ICC, including by arresting and surrendering any wanted persons in the Ugandan State. See id.
51. Agreement on Accountability and Reconciliation, Uganda-Lord’s Resistance Army, Annex, art. 7,
Feb. 19, 2008, available at http://northernuganda.usvpp.gov/uploads/images/u_h8S9SwfKutKGw70eM4vw/
agendaitem3296.pdf; Otim & Wierda, supra note 38, at 3; Manisuli Ssenyonjo, How Joseph Kony is Keeping
His Options Open, THE GUARDIAN (Mar. 26, 2008, 1:17 PM), http://www.guardian.co.uk/katine/2008/mar/
26/lra.background.
52. Agreement on Accountability and Reconciliation, supra note 51, at art. 19; Otim & Wierda, supra
note 38, at 3; Ssenyonjo, supra note 51.
53. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 19, July 17, 1988, 2187 U.N.T.S. 3. Article 19,
entitled “Challenges to the jurisdiction of the Court or the admissibility of a case,” provides, in relevant part:
1. The Court shall satisfy itself that it has jurisdiction in any case brought before it. The
Court may, on its own motion, determine the admissibility of a case in accordance with
article 17.
2. Challenges to the admissibility of a case on the grounds referred to in article 17 or
challenges to the jurisdiction of the Court may be made by:
...
(b) A State which has jurisdiction over a case, on the ground that it is investigating or
prosecuting the case or has investigated or prosecuted . . . .
Id.; Otim & Wierda, supra note 38, at 4.
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of the Rome Statute. If granted, such deferral would provide the Ugandan
government a year, with the possibility of renewal, within which to bring the five
55
wanted LRA leaders to justice domestically.
Ultimately, it appears that these assurances were not enough. In late 2008,
56
the peace process degenerated when Kony refused to sign the final peace deal.
In the meantime, in July 2008, the Ugandan government went ahead with its
57
plans to establish the War Crimes Division of the High Court of Uganda. The
War Crimes Division of that Court recently finished its first trial of an LRA
commander, concluding that the accused was entitled to amnesty for any crimes
58
committed during the conflict. Furthermore, in 2010, the Ugandan government
passed the International Criminal Court Act, incorporating the Rome Statute into
59
Ugandan law.

54. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, supra note 53, at art. 16. Article 16, entitled
“Deferral of investigation or prosecution,” provides:
No investigation or prosecution may be commenced or proceeded with under this Statute for a
period of 12 months after the Security Council, in a resolution adopted under Chapter VII of
the Charter of the United Nations, has requested the Court to that effect; that request may be
renewed by the Council under the same conditions.
Id.
55. INT’L CRISIS GRP., NORTHERN UGANDA, supra note 48, at 9; Otim & Wierda, supra note 38, at 5. In
February 2008, the ICC Pre-trial Chamber requested the Ugandan government to provide information regarding
the status of the arrest warrants, noting the agreement to establish the War Crimes Division. The government
responded that that establishment would take place after the final peace agreement with the LRA, that the War
Crimes Division “is not meant to supplant the work of the International Criminal Court and accordingly, those
individuals who were indicted by the International Criminal Court will have to be brought before the [War
Crimes Division] for trial.” See Prosecutor v. Joseph Kony, Vincent Otti, Okot Odhiambo, Dominic Ongwen,
Case No. ICC-02/04-01/05, Report by the Registrar on the Execution of the Request for Information from the
Republic of Uganda on the Status of Execution of the Warrants of Arrest, 3 (Mar. 27, 2009), http://www.icccpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc461285.pdf.
56. Otim & Wierda, supra note 38, at 5; INT’L CRISIS GRP., THE LORD’S RESISTANCE ARMY: END
GAME? 1 (2011), available at http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/africa/horn-of-africa/uganda/182%20
The%20Lords%20Resistance%20Army%20-%20End%20Game.pdf.
57. Otim & Wierda, supra note 38, at 3. In October 2008, the ICC Pre-trial Chamber initiated
proceedings under Article 19(1) of the Rome Statute to determine whether it could still investigate and
prosecute the case against Kony et al. In March 2009, it determined that the case is still admissible, finding:
the scenario against which the admissibility of the Case has to be determined remains therefore
the same as at the time of the issuance of the Warrants, that is one of total inaction on the part
of the relevant national authorities; accordingly, there is no reason for the Chamber to review
the positive determination of the admissibility of the Case made at that stage.
In December 2009, the Appeals Chamber affirmed. See Prosecutor v. Joseph Kony, Vincent Otti, Okot
Odhiambo, Dominic Ongwen, Case No. ICC-02/04-01/05 OA 3, Judgment on the appeal of the Defence against
the “Decision on the admissibility of the case under article 19(1) of the Statute” of 10 March 2009, ¶¶ 7, 12, 92
(Sep. 16, 2009), available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc743635.pdf.
58. Uganda’s Amnesty for LRA Commander a ‘Setback’ for Justice, AMNESTY INT’L (Sept. 23, 2011)
http://www.amnesty.org/en/news-and-updates/uganda%E2%80%99s-amnesty-lra-commander%E2%80%98setback%E2%80%99-justice-2011-09-23.
59. However, this Act “is prospective from June 25, 2010, and thus cannot be applied to the period of
conflict in [N]orthern Uganda.” OPEN SOC’Y FOUND., PUTTING COMPLEMENTARITY INTO PRACTICE:
DOMESTIC JUSTICE FOR INTERNATIONAL CRIMES IN DRC, UGANDA, AND KENYA 7 (2011), available at
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While Northern Uganda has experienced relative calm since the initial
ceasefire in 2006, the LRA has reemerged, terrorizing communities in the
60
Democratic Republic of Congo, South Sudan, and the Central African Republic.
In response, in October 2011, U.S. President Barack Obama authorized the
deployment of some 100 U.S. Special Forces troops to advise the Ugandan
government on removing Kony and other senior LRA leaders from the
61
battlefield.
In the context of the conflict in Northern Uganda, one can only wonder
whether Kony would have signed a peace agreement, thereby ending the LRA’s
reign of terror in the region, if the ICC arrest warrants had been rescinded. Yet,
one could also argue that Kony was only willing to participate in peace talks at
all because the ICC had taken action. Furthermore, it is significant that, similar to
the Chilean context, the threat of international prosecution motivated the
Ugandan government to set up its own system for trying war crimes suspects.
Whether this is indeed a positive development will depend on the quality of
justice meted out by that court, which remains to be seen. At the same time, it is
clear that the ICC indictment of LRA leaders has not prevented continued
violence in the region. Additionally, with some of the highest-level alleged
perpetrators still evading both international and local accountability, justice to
victims in Northern Uganda has yet to be realized.
Ultimately, it is difficult to conclude in this case whether the pursuit of
international criminal justice assisted in the facilitation of, or acted as an obstacle
to, peace. Paradoxically, the only reasonable conclusion may very well be that it
did both.
C. The International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia and Peace in
the Balkans
The work of the ICTY arguably presents a more clear-cut case in which it
may be concluded that international criminal justice, to some extent, has
facilitated the pursuit of peace. The Security Council established the ICTY in
1993 as a means of addressing the protracted conflict in the region of the former
Yugoslavia while the war in the Balkans was still raging. It was considered that
prosecuting perpetrators of war-time atrocities, when national courts were
unwilling or unable to do so, would contribute to the cessation of hostilities, the
62
maintenance of peace, and to reconciliation in the region.

http://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/sites/default/files/putting-complementarity-into-practice-20110120.pdf.
60. INT’L CRISIS GRP., NORTHERN UGANDA, supra note 48, at 20; INT’L CRISIS GRP., THE LORD’S
RESISTANCE ARMY, supra note 56, at 1-2.
61. INT’L CRISIS GRP., THE LORD’S RESISTANCE ARMY, supra note 56, at 1-2.
62. See S.C. Res. 827, U.N.Doc. S/RES/827 (May 25, 1993).
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The Dayton Peace Accords, which ended the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina
63
(“Bosnia”), were signed in December 1995. Slobodan Milošević, then President
of Serbia and Montenegro, was a key party to the peace process, along with
64
Croatian President Franjo Tuđman and Bosnian President Alija Izetbegović. By
this time, Bosnian Serb political leader Radovan Karadžić had already been
65
indicted by the ICTY for his alleged role in atrocities committed during the war.
It was not until May 1999 that the ICTY indicted Milošević for alleged war
66
crimes in Kosovo. Significantly, this marked the first time a sitting Head of
67
State had been indicted for war crimes. Milošević was indicted amidst the North
American Treaty Organization air strikes against the Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia, which commenced after international efforts to resolve the Kosovo
68
conflict through peace talks at Rambouillet had failed.
As an ad hoc, temporary institution, the ICTY was never meant to substitute
for the adjudication of war crimes cases at the national level. Accordingly, ten
years after the ICTY’s establishment, in Resolution 1503 (2003), the Security
Council endorsed a strategy devised by the ICTY’s Judges for the completion of
69
its work. Pursuant to this Completion Strategy, the ICTY concentrated on the
prosecution of the highest-level accused and transferred the cases of lower and
mid-level accused to courts in the region, which were considered at that point, to
70
varying degrees, willing and ready to receive them. Furthermore, in Resolution
1503, the Security Council called upon the international community to assist
national jurisdictions, as part of the Completion Strategy, in improving their
71
capacity to prosecute cases transferred from the ICTY. In this manner, capacity
building of courts in the former Yugoslavia handling war crimes cases was
integrated into the ICTY’s mandate.

63. General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bosn. & Herz.-Croat.-Yugo.,
Dec. 14, 1995, 35 I.L.M. 75, available at http://www.ohr.int/dwnld/?content_id=379.
64. Seven Questions: Richard Holbrooke on Radovan Karadzic, FOREIGN POLICY (July 24, 2008),
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2008/07/23/seven_questions_richard_holbrooke_on_radovan_karadzic;
Jim Hooper, Trying War Criminals—Dayton’s Mandate for Apprehending War Criminals, PBS,
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/karadzic/trial/hooper.html (last visited Nov. 12, 2012).
65. Karadžić was indicted by the Tribunal in July 1995. See Prosecutor v. Radovan Karadžić, Case No.
IT-95-5-I, Indictment (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia July 25, 1995), http://www.icty.org/x/
cases/karadzic/ind/en/kar-ii950724e.pdf.
66. Following his transfer to the ICTY, in 2001, Milošević was also indicted for crimes in Croatia and
Bosnia and Herzegovina. See Leila Sadya Nadat, The Trial of Slobodan Milosevic, AM. SOC’Y OF INT’L LAW
(Oct. 2002), http://www.asil.org/insigh90.cfm.
67. Milosevic Indictment Makes History, CNN (May 27, 1999), http://articles.cnn.com/1999-0527/world/9905_27_kosovo.milosevic.04_1_milosevic-indictment-nikola-sainovic-milosevic-andfour?_s=PM:WORLD.
68. See The Conflicts, UN ICTY, http://www.icty.org/sid/322 (last visited Nov. 12, 2012).
69. S.C. Res. 1503, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1503 (Aug. 28, 2003).
70. Completion Strategy, UN ICTY, http://www.icty.org/sid/10016 (last visited Nov. 19, 2012); see S.C.
Res. 1503, supra note 69.
71. See S.C. Res. 1503, supra note 69.
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In line with its Completion Strategy, the ICTY indicted a total of 161 high72
level perpetrators, and will not be indicting any more. The ICTY also
transferred eight cases of lower-level accused to courts in Bosnia, Croatia and
73
Serbia. However, thousands of crimes committed during the wars in the former
74
Yugoslavia remain to be investigated and/or tried. To facilitate this effort, the
75
ICTY, often working in tandem with international partners, has gone to great
lengths over the years to assist national legal institutions and professionals in
building their capacity to deal with these crimes, including through supporting
the establishment of specialized war crimes chambers in Bosnia, Croatia and
76
Serbia.
The degree to which the ICTY, through its efforts, has been successful in
fulfilling its mandate of contributing to the restoration and maintenance of peace
in the region, and in particular, to reconciliation, has generated much debate.
However, it is difficult to dispute that as in the Ugandan and Chilean cases, the
efforts of the international community to hold accountable perpetrators of
atrocities committed during the wars in the Balkans served as a catalyst for the
domestic prosecution of alleged war criminals. Courts in Bosnia, Serbia and
Croatia have taken up the mantle and have made significant progress in
adjudicating their own cases in accordance with international human rights
77
standards. Although these jurisdictions still face serious challenges, for
example, in dealing with substantial case backlogs, providing witness protection

72. Development of the Local Judiciaries, UN ICTY, http://www.icty.org/sid/10462 (last visited Nov.
19, 2012); see Key Figures, UN ICTY, http://www.icty.org/sections/TheCases/KeyFigures (last updated Oct.
16, 2012).
73. Additionally, the Tribunal’s Office of the Prosecutor transferred files from cases that were
investigated, but did not result in the issuance of indictments for follow-up by local prosecutors’ offices as
appropriate. See Transfer of Cases, UN ICTY, http://www.icty.org/sections/TheCases/TransferofCases (last
visited Nov. 19, 2012).
74. Int’l Justice Desk, Thousands Still to be Tried in Balkans for War Crimes, RADIO NETHERLANDS
WORLDWIDE (May 14, 2012, 2:18 PM), http://www.rnw.nl/international-justice/article/thousands-still-be-triedbalkans-war-crimes.
75. For example, with financial support from the European Union, the Tribunal entered into a
partnership with the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe’s (“OSCE”) Office for Democratic
Institutions and Human Rights (“ODIHR”), the United Nations Interregional Crime and Justice Research
Institute, and OSCE Field Missions in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, and Serbia, to implement the “War
Crimes Justice Project” aimed at supporting the capacity of legal professionals in the region of the former
Yugoslavia dealing with war crimes cases. War Crimes Justice Project, OSCE OFF. FOR DEMOCRATIC INST. &
HUM. RTS., http://www.osce.org/odihr/74803 (last visited Nov. 19, 2012); see Capacity Building, UN ICTY,
http://www.icty.org/ sections/Outreach/CapacityBuilding (last visited Nov. 19, 2012).
76. See Development of the Local Judiciaries, supra note 72.
77. See, e.g., OSCE, DELIVERING JUSTICE IN BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA: AN OVERVIEW OF WAR
CRIMES PROCESSING FROM 2005 TO 2010 7 (2011), available at http://www.oscebih.org/documents/osce_bih_
doc_2011051909500706eng.pdf; HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, UNFINISHED BUSINESS: SERBIA’S WAR CRIMES
CHAMBER 2 (2007), available at http://www.hrw.org/legacy/backgrounder/eca/serbia0607/serbia0607web.pdf;
INT’L CTR. FOR TRANSITIONAL JUST., CROATIA: SELECTED DEVELOPMENTS IN TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE 5, 1421 (2006), available at http://ictj.org/sites/default/files/ICTJ-FormerYugoslavia-Croatia-Developments-2006English_0.pdf.
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and support, and securing evidence, it can be concluded that rather than
derailing peace efforts, through stimulating and supporting domestic war crimes
prosecutions, efforts on the international plane have contributed to strengthening
the rule of law, and in this respect, to peace-building in the Balkans.
D. Conclusion
A lesson that can be drawn from these case studies is that transitional justice
cannot be considered and addressed through a single approach. The pursuit of
justice is context-specific, and different mechanisms are appropriate in different
situations. The establishment of an international criminal tribunal to try alleged
war criminals may have had a positive impact in the former Yugoslavia, due to
the socio-political and cultural factors specific to the circumstances of that
conflict, as well as the timing of the pursuit of justice. However, the success of
tribunals such as the ICTY does not necessarily suggest that an international
criminal tribunal is the most appropriate approach in every context, nor that
prosecuting alleged perpetrators alone can adequately address all of the problems
faced by societies in transition. Ultimately, it is important that whatever method
or combination of methods is pursued, due regard is paid to the necessary balance
between peace and justice.
The complexities that can arise when attempting to reconcile peace and
justice are well portrayed in an op-ed by Ian Paisley that recently appeared in the
79
New York Times. He discusses the fact that the ICC just rendered its first guilty
verdict in the case of Thomas Lubanga for coercing children to be soldiers in the
80
Democratic Republic of Congo. He starts, “An African proverb states, ‘Peace is
81
costly but it is worth the expense.’” Here, the expense, perhaps, is justice. He
points out that “[t]he Court to date has spent around $1 billion,” and that
82
although justice “has been done . . . there is no peace in that country.” And there
is not. Finally, he concludes that:
Proponents of the [ICC] say there cannot be peace without justice. Yet
experience teaches us that this is not always the case. Reconciliation is
not an easy option, but it does allow people to move forward with the
hope of unity, and the potential for justice in the future. The experiences
of Northern Ireland and South Africa show us that there is nothing more

78. See generally OSCE, supra note 77; HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 77; INT’L CTR. FOR
TRANSITIONAL JUST., supra note 77.
79. Mr. Paisley is the son of Rev. Ian Paisley, former leader of the Democratic Unionist Party in
Northern Ireland. See Ian Paisley, Peace Must Not Be the Victim of International Justice, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 16,
2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/17/opinion/peace-must-not-be-the-victim-of-international-justice.html.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id.

14

[1] BROWER.DOC (DO NOT DELETE)

7/22/2013 4:00 PM

Global Business & Development Law Journal / Vol. 26
important than peace. If this means the International Criminal Court does
not always intervene or deliver justice, it may be a price that is worth
83
paying.
III. HOT TOPIC 2: THE PERILS OF THE FRAGMENTATION
OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
In addition to the unprecedented development in the past two decades of
international and hybrid criminal courts, there has also been an enormous growth
84
in a variety of other types of international tribunals. The proliferation of these
institutions has led to the phenomenon of disparate courts interpreting and
applying the same legal principles and instruments, sometimes in
complementary, but often in competing ways. The absence of an international
mechanism to resolve inconsistent interpretations has raised concerns regarding
the perils of the fragmentation of international law.
A. ICJ and ICTY Treatment of the Legal Standard for Attribution of State
Responsibility for Internationally Wrongful Acts—“Effective Control,”
“Overall Control,” or It Depends?
Recently, the ICJ and the ICTY have been at odds regarding the issue of
what degree of control over paramilitaries is required to attribute their acts to a
foreign State, therefore rendering them internationally wrongful. The issue first
arose in 1984 in the ICJ’s Nicaragua case, which concerned the activities of the
contras, a Nicaraguan rebel group that was operating in Nicaragua against the
85
Sandinista regime. In that case, the Court considered whether alleged violations
of international humanitarian law committed by the contras were imputable to
the United States, resulting in the international responsibility of the latter for
86
those acts.

83. Id.
84. For example, since the 1990s, there has been a tremendous increase in bilateral and multilateral
investment promotion and protection treaties, which provide for mandatory arbitration of disputes before an
arbitral tribunal. This has generated a proliferation of treaty-based investment dispute arbitral tribunals. See,
e.g., Charles N. Brower, The Evolution of the International Judiciary: Denationalization through Jurisdictional
Fragmentation, in THE AMERICAN SOCIETY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW: PROCEEDINGS OF THE 103RD ANNUAL
MEETING 170, 182 (2009).
85. Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), Judgment, 1986 I.C.J.
14, ¶ 392 (June 27).
86. Id. ¶¶ 20, 113. The Court also considered whether the acts of “persons of the nationality of
unidentified Latin American countries,” known as “UCLAs,” such as blowing up underwater oil pipelines and
an attack on an oil and storage facility, were imputable to the United States. With regard to the UCLA’s, the
Court found in the affirmative, reasoning that “[a]lthough it is not proved that any United States military
personnel took a direct part in the operations, agents of the United States participated in the planning, direction,
support and execution of the operations.” See id. ¶¶ 81, 85-86.
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In addressing this question, the Court first considered that it was necessary to
determine:
whether or not the relationship of the contras to the United States
Government was so much one of dependence on the one side and control
on the other that it would be right to equate the contras, for legal
purposes, with an organ of the United States Government, or as acting on
87
behalf of that Government.
The Court found that “there is no clear evidence of the United States having
actually exercised such a degree of control in all fields as to justify treating the
88
contras as acting on its behalf.” Specifically, it reasoned, inter alia, that
although the evidence before it indicated that the assistance provided by the
United States to the contras was crucial to the contras’ activities, the evidence
did not establish that the contras were completely dependent on the United
89
States. However, the Court further found that this conclusion did not “suffice to
resolve the entire question of the responsibility incurred by the United States
90
through its assistance to the contras.”
According to the Court, in order for the acts to be imputable to the United
States, it was sufficient to prove that the United States “had effective control of
the military or paramilitary operations in the course of which the alleged
91
violations were committed.” To establish effective control, the Court required a
showing “that the United States directed or enforced the perpetration of the acts
92
contrary to human rights and humanitarian law alleged by” Nicaragua. The
Court concluded that although the United States provided various crucial forms
of assistance to the contras, including financial and logistical support, the
evidence did not demonstrate that the United States directed or enforced the
93
alleged acts.
In the case of Prosecutor v. Tadić, the ICTY also addressed the legal
standard for imputing the acts of individuals to a foreign State, specifically, the
94
acts of the Bosnian Serb Army to the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (“FRY”).
In this case, however, the purpose of the inquiry was not to determine
international responsibility for the Bosnian Serb forces’ acts, but rather to
determine whether the Bosnian Serb Army acted as a de facto state organ,

87. See id. ¶ 109.
88. See id.
89. See id. ¶ 110.
90. See id.
91. See id. ¶ 115 (emphasis added).
92. See id.
93. See id. ¶ 116.
94. Prosecutor v. Duško Tadić, Case No. IT-94-1-T, Trial Chamber Judgment, ¶ 584 (Int’l Crim. Trib.
for the Former Yugoslavia May 7, 1997), http://www.icty.org/x/cases/tadic/tjug/en/tad-tsj70507JT2-e.pdf.
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thereby rendering the conflict in Bosnia international. In answering this
question, the ICTY revisited the test for attribution of state responsibility set
forth by the ICJ in the Nicaragua case (“Nicaragua test”).
In interpreting and applying the Nicaragua test, the majority of the Trial
Chamber considered that it was “neither necessary nor sufficient merely to show
that the [Bosnian Serb Army] was dependent, even completely dependent, on the
[FRY Army] and the [FRY] for the necessities of war. It must also be shown that
the [FRY Army] and the [FRY] exercised the potential for control inherent in
that relationship of dependency or that the [Bosnian Serb Army] had otherwise
96
placed itself under the control of the [FRY].”
Presiding Judge Gabrielle Kirk McDonald, however, disagreed with the
97
majority’s interpretation of the Nicaragua test. She considered that Nicaragua
established two distinct tests for attribution. Specifically, she stated that “the
effective control standard was never intended to describe the degree of proof
necessary for a determination of agency founded on dependency and control” and
that “the majority erroneously imports the requirement of effective control to an
98
agency determination.”
Judge McDonald observed that the effective control requirement was not
mentioned until after the ICJ determined that there was no agency relationship
between the contras and the United States. On this basis, she concluded that “the
showing of effective control is a separate and distinct basis for determining State
99
responsibility for the conduct of others.” She further found that “the appropriate
100
test of agency from Nicaragua is one of ‘dependency.’” In sum, while the
majority found that the Nicaragua test did not necessarily require a showing of
dependence on the State, but did require a high degree of control by the State—
namely, effective control—Judge McDonald found that with a showing of
dependency, a further showing of effective control was not required.
On appeal, the ICTY Appeals Chamber rejected the Nicaragua test
101
altogether. It determined instead that the requisite degree of control required
102
under international law can vary in the circumstances of each case. It
distinguished between two scenarios. First, it considered that for the actions of
individuals or groups not organized into military structures, it is necessary to
show that “specific instructions concerning the commission of that particular act

95. Id. ¶ 585; Prosecutor v. Duško Tadić, Case No. IT-94-1-A, Appeals Chamber Judgment, ¶ 104 (Int’l
Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia July 15, 1999), http://www.icty.org/x/cases/tadic/acjug/en/tadaj990715e.pdf.
96. Prosecutor v. Duško Tadić, Case No. IT-94-1-T, Trial Chamber Judgment, ¶ 588.
97. Id. at 288, 292 (McDonald, J., dissenting).
98. Id. at 294 (McDonald, J., dissenting).
99. Id. at 295 (McDonald, J., dissenting).
100. Id. at 288, 299 (McDonald, J., dissenting).
101. Prosecutor v. Duško Tadić, Case No. IT-94-1-A, Appeals Chamber Judgment, ¶ 115.
102. Id. ¶ 117.
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had been issued by that State to the individual or group in question” or that “the
unlawful act had been publicly endorsed or approved ex post facto by the State at
103
issue.” However, when the acts of “armed forces or militias or paramilitary
units” were at issue, the Court required a less stringent showing that a state
wields “overall control” over the group, including through financing, training,
and equipping the group, as well as coordinating or assisting in the planning of
104
the military actions of the group. Demonstration that the state issued
105
instructions for the commission of the specific act in question was not required.
106
The ICJ recently revisited this issue in the “Bosnian Genocide” case, and
107
relied on its test set forth in Nicaragua. In doing so, the ICJ explained that it
108
was “unable to subscribe” to the ICTY’s contrary interpretation of the issue.
The Court reasoned that the ICTY’s jurisdiction is limited to determining the
criminal responsibility of individuals and does not extend to questions of state
109
responsibility. It noted that it attached a high degree of importance to the
ICTY’s legal and factual findings in relation to issues of criminal liability that
fall within its jurisdiction, but surmised that the same was not true for issues of
110
general international law that do not fall within the ICTY’s specific purview.
The ICJ also clarified the Nicaragua test. Referring to the Nicaragua Court’s
finding that “the evidence available to the Court . . . is insufficient to demonstrate
111
[the contras’] complete dependence on United States aid,” it noted that:
according to the Court’s jurisprudence, persons, groups of persons or
entities may, for purposes of international responsibility, be equated with
State organs even if that status does not follow from internal law,
provided that in fact the persons, groups or entities act in “complete
dependence” on the State, of which they are ultimately merely the

103. Id. ¶ 137.
104. Id. ¶¶ 131, 137.
105. Id.
106. Specifically, the Court considered whether the Srebrenica massacres “were committed by persons
who, though not having the status of organs of [Serbia and Montenegro], nevertheless acted on its instructions
or under its direction or control.” Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime
of Genocide (Bosn. & Herz. v. Serb. & Montenegro), Reports of Judgments, Advisory Opinions and Orders,
2007 I.C.J. 43 ¶ 396 (Feb. 26).
107. Specifically, the Court stated that:
[g]enocide will be considered as attributable to a State if and to the extent that the physical acts
constitutive of genocide that have been committed by organs or persons other than the State’s
own agents were carried out, wholly or in part, on the instructions or directions of the State, or
under its effective control.
Id. ¶ 401.
108. Id. ¶ 403.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id. ¶ 391 (citing Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.),
1986 I.C.J. 14, ¶ 110 (June 27)).
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instrument. In such a case, it is appropriate to look beyond legal status
alone, in order to grasp the reality of the relationship between the person
taking action, and the State to which he is so closely attached as to
112
appear to be nothing more than its agent . . . .
Having answered this question in the negative in terms of the Bosnian Serb
Army’s relationship to the FRY, the Court then explained that even absent a
relationship of “complete dependence,” state responsibility could still arise if, as
established in the Nicaragua case, it was proven that the state had “directed or
enforced the perpetration of the acts contrary to human rights and humanitarian
113
law alleged by the applicant State.” It further explained that for such conduct to
give rise to state responsibility, it would “have to be proved that that State had
effective control of the military or paramilitary operations in the course of which
114
the alleged violations were committed”. Thus, the Court in the Bosnian
Genocide case clarified that, as Judge McDonald argued in her Tadić dissent, the
Nicaragua case established two distinct tests for the attribution of state
responsibility.
It appears that the ICJ attempted to explain and, perhaps, justify the
inconsistent interpretations of the ICJ and ICTY as resulting from differences in
115
jurisdiction. In doing so, the ICJ dodged the conclusion that its own
jurisprudence conflicted with that of a fellow international tribunal. Time will
only tell whether in the future, as international questions are increasingly brought
to the fore, such implicit cooperation will continue or whether areas of
divergence will grow.
B. Inconsistency in Decisions by Investment Dispute Tribunals—Disparate
Interpretations of the MFN Clause in the Germany-Argentina Bilateral
Investment Treaty
Fragmentation also has arisen in the realm of international investment
disputes, with the growth of institutions devoted to the resolution of such
disputes. For example, Judge Brower has been involved in a series of
international investment arbitrations concerning disputes arising from the

112. Id. ¶ 392.
113. Id. ¶ 399 (citing Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua, 1986 I.C.J. 14, ¶
115).
114. Id. (citing Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua, 1986 I.C.J. 14, ¶ 115).
115. In this regard, the Court posited that “[i]nsofar as the ‘overall control’ test is employed to determine
whether or not an armed conflict is international, which was the sole question which the Appeals Chamber was
called upon to decide, it may well be that the test is applicable and suitable.” However, the Court was not
persuaded that the “overall control” test was equally applicable under the law of State responsibility for the
purpose of determining “when a State is responsible for acts committed by paramilitary units, armed forces
which are not among its official organs.” Id. ¶ 404.
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116

Germany-Argentina bilateral investment treaty (“BIT”) in which different
arbitral tribunals have interpreted identical Germany-Argentina BIT provisions in
117
118
inconsistent ways. At least four German companies, Siemens, Hochtief,
119
120
Wintershall, and Daimler, have brought cases against Argentina under the
BIT. The issue in each case has been whether the claimants were required under
Article 10 of the BIT to spend eighteen months seeking the resolution of their
investment disputes in Argentine courts as a prerequisite to invoking
international arbitration, or whether, relying upon the BIT’s Most-FavouredNation (“MFN”) provisions, they were entitled first to submit the dispute to
international arbitration.
Pursuant to Article 10(1) of the BIT, if a dispute arises between a German
121
investor in Argentina, or vice versa, the parties should seek to settle the dispute.
However, Article 10(2) further provides that:
If a dispute within the meaning of paragraph 1 cannot be settled within
six months from the date on which one of the parties concerned gave
notice of the dispute, it shall, at the request of either party, be submitted
to the competent courts of the Contracting Party in whose territory the
122
investment was made.
Article 10(3) further provides that:
The dispute may be submitted to an international arbitral tribunal in any
of the following circumstances: (a) At the request of one of the parties to
the dispute where, after a period of 18 months has elapsed from the
moment when the judicial process provided for by paragraph 2 of this
article was initiated, no final decision has been given or where a decision

116. Treaty between the Federal Republic of Germany and the Argentine Republic on the
Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Investment, Ger.-Arg., Oct. 8, 1993, 1910 U.N.T.S. 171
[hereinafter Germany-Argentina BIT].
117. Siemens v. Arg., ICSID Case No. ARB/02/8, Decision on Jurisdiction (Aug. 3, 2004),
https://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=CasesRH&actionVal=showDoc&docId=DC508_
En&caseId=C7.
118. Hochtief v. Arg., ICSID Case No. ARB/07/31, Decision on Jurisdiction (Oct. 24, 2011),
https://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=CasesRH&actionVal=showDoc&docId=DC2351
_En&caseId=C260.
119. Wintershall v. Arg., ICSID Case No. ARB/04/14, Award (Dec. 8, 2008), https://icsid.worldbank.
org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=CasesRH&actionVal=showDoc&docId=DC1492_En&caseId=C39.
120. Daimler v. Arg., ICSID Case No. ARB/05/1, Award (Aug. 22, 2012), http://www.italaw.com/
sites/default/files/case-documents/ita1082.pdf.
121. Germany-Argentina BIT, supra note 116, art. 10(1).
122. Id. at art. 10(2).
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has been made but the parties are still in dispute; (b) Where both parties
123
to the dispute have so agreed.
Pursuant to the MFN provisions, no contracting party shall provide in its
territory to the investments of nationals or companies of the other contracting
party less favorable treatment than that provided to its own companies or
124
nationals or those of third-party states.
In two of the cases, Siemens and Hochtief, the tribunals ruled that the MFN
125
provisions in the BIT permitted the Claimants to arbitrate. However, in the
Wintershall and Daimler cases, the tribunal ruled to the contrary, finding that the
Claimants could not rely on the MFN provisions in order to avoid first submitting
126
their disputes to Argentine courts for eighteen months.

123. Id. at art. 10(3).
124. The following BIT provisions refer to MFN treatment and were considered by the tribunals, to
varying degrees:
Article 3(1), which provides:
Neither Contracting Party shall subject investments in its territory by or with the
participation of nationals or companies of the other Contracting party to treatment less
favourable than it accords to investments of its own nationals or companies or to
investments of nationals or companies of any third State.
Article 3(2), which provides:
Neither Contracting Party shall subject nationals or companies of the other Contracting
Party, as regards their activity in connection with investments in its territory, to treatment
less favourable than it accords to its own nationals or companies or to nationals or
companies of any third State.
Article 4, which provides, in relevant part:
(1) Investments by nationals or companies of either Contracting Party shall enjoy full
protection as well as juridical security in the territory of the other Contracting Party.
...
(3) Nationals or companies of either Contracting Party whose investments suffer losses
in the territory of the other Contracting Party owing to war or other armed conflict,
revolution, a state of national emergency or insurrection shall be accorded by the
latter Contracting Party treatment which is no less favourable than that accorded to
its own nationals or companies, as regards restitution, compensation, indemnification
or other valuable consideration. Such payments shall be freely transferable.
(4) Nationals or companies of either Contracting Party shall enjoy most-favoured-nation
treatment in the territory of the other Contracting Party in respect of the matters
provided for in this article.
Article 7(1), which provides:
If the legislation of either Contracting Party or obligations under international law
existing at present or established hereinafter between the Contracting parties in addition
to this Treaty contain a regulation, whether general or specific, entitling investments by
nationals or companies of the other Contracting Party to a treatment more favourable than
is provided for by this Treaty, such regulation shall, to the extent that it is more
favourable, take precedence over this Treaty.
See Siemens, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/8, ¶¶ 82, 88; Hochtief, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/31, ¶ 15; Wintershall,
ICSID Case No. ARB/04/14, ¶¶ 10-11, 160-97.
125. Siemens, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/8, ¶ 184; Hochtief, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/31, ¶¶ 75, 124-25.
126. Wintershall, ICSID Case No. ARB/04/14, ¶ 197; Daimler, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/1, ¶ 281.
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More specifically, in the Siemens case, Siemens invoked the GermanyArgentina BIT’s MFN provisions to support its contention that it was entitled to
submit its dispute directly to international arbitration, as permitted under the BIT
127
between Argentina and Chile. Argentina claimed that the scope of the MFN
provisions in the Germany-Argentina BIT did not include the BIT’s dispute
128
settlement system. In 2004, the Tribunal unanimously ruled in favor of
129
Siemens, finding that the MFN provisions permitted the claimants to arbitrate.
The Tribunal in the Hochtief case considered the same issue, whether
Hochtief could rely on the MFN provisions in the Germany-Argentina BIT to
seek direct access to international arbitration, without prior referral to the
130
domestic court of Argentina. Like Siemens, Hochtief claimed that the MFN
provisions “entitle[d] it to rely upon the more liberal provisions on dispute
131
settlement in the Argentina-Chile BIT.” Argentina argued that the MFN
provisions “applie[d] only to substantive protections under the BIT, which do not
132
include the clauses on dispute resolution in Article 10.” Last year, the Tribunal,
by majority, ruled that the MFN provisions applied to dispute settlement under
133
Article 10 of the BIT and that the arbitration could proceed. In reaching this
conclusion, the Tribunal noted that it:
is conscious of the advantages of consistency in the approaches of
different tribunals to similar questions. It is also aware of the significance
that other tribunals have attached to differences between the formulations
of MFN provisions in various treaties. That said, it is the responsibility of
this Tribunal to interpret to the best of its ability the specific provisions
of the particular treaties that are applicable in this case, and not to choose
between broad doctrines or schools of thought, or to conduct a headcount of arbitral awards taking various positions and to fall in behind the
134
numerical majority.
In the Wintershall and Daimler cases, however, the tribunals reasoned, in
part, that recourse to arbitration is conditioned strictly upon compliance with the
provision of Article 10 of the Germany-Argentina BIT requiring that a dispute
first be submitted to Argentine courts for eighteen months, and furthermore, that

127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
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Siemens, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/8, ¶ 32.
Id. ¶¶ 35-40.
Id. ¶ 184.
Hochtief, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/31, ¶¶ 15-19.
Id. ¶ 56.
Id. ¶ 20.
Id. ¶¶ 75, 124-25.
Id. ¶ 58.
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Article 10 can only be circumvented when it is clear from the text of the MFN
135
provisions that it was the intent of the contracting parties to permit this option.
These cases underscore one of the greatest fears arising from the proliferation
of international courts and tribunals—the potential that disparate decisions might
lead to unfair or prejudicial outcomes. Unlike in the ICJ and ICTY cases
discussed previously, the contradictory outcomes of these Germany-Argentina
BIT arbitrations cannot be defended on the grounds of differences in
jurisdiction—nor can they be justified on factual grounds. Ultimately, the
different rulings can be explained purely by the fact that different panels of
arbitrators construed the same law differently. Reasonable minds can and will
differ on the same set of facts and when confronted with the same laws—this is
an indisputable and unavoidable feature of our domestic and international justice
systems. However, such uncertainty is magnified in the international arena when
one accounts for the multitude of international tribunals, which exercise separate
mandates and are not legally accountable to one another, but can be governed by
overlapping bodies of law, and the lack of an international appellate body to
resolve inconsistencies. While this may indeed be unavoidable, this feature of
international law raises concerns for its participants, who often rely on
consistency and predictability in making decisions to participate in the first
instance. It remains to be seen whether a mechanism can be devised and accepted
by states that would better ensure consistency of rulings.
IV. HOT TOPIC 3: THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN DOMESTIC COURTS AND
INTERNATIONAL COURTS AND TRIBUNALS
Contemporary structural and substantive developments in the arena of
international law have also led to a growing interface, or what some would
characterize as a “clash,” between the jurisprudence of international institutions
and domestic courts. In an increasingly interdependent world, domestic courts are
now frequently called upon to interpret and apply the decisions of international
legal institutions, and international legal institutions are required to apply and
analyze the legality of national decisions. The question remains whether these
institutions, both international and domestic, can coexist harmoniously and
ensure that justice is served.
A. Avco Corp. v. Iran Aircraft Industries
Avco Corp. v. Iran Aircraft Industries, a case in which Judge Brower was
involved as a Member of the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal, exemplifies this

135. Wintershall, ICSID Case No. ARB/04/14, ¶¶ 114-57, 167-72; Daimler, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/1,
¶¶ 200, 281.
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136

trend. The dispute, first submitted to the Tribunal in 1982, concerned Avco’s
performance and Iran Aircraft Industries’ payment under certain contracts. Avco
137
relied on voluminous invoices to prove its claim. At a pre-hearing conference
before the Tribunal’s three-judge Chamber to which the case was assigned, Avco
requested guidance regarding whether the invoices should be submitted into
evidence or whether the Tribunal would prefer to receive independently audited
138
and authenticated accounts receivable ledgers listing the invoices. The
139
Chamber informed Avco that such ledgers would suffice. However, in its 1988
decision, the Tribunal ultimately found 2-1 that it “[could] not grant Avco’s
claim solely on the basis of an affidavit and a list of invoices, even if the
140
existence of the invoices was certified by an independent audit,” and Iran
141
Aircraft Industries received a significant net award on its counterclaim. Judge
Brower issued an Opinion in which he strongly dissented to this outcome on the
basis that “the Tribunal . . . misled [Avco], however unwittingly, regarding the
evidence it was required to submit, thereby depriving [Avco], to that extent, of
142
the ability to present its case . . . .”
When Iran sought to enforce its award in a U.S. District Court under the New
143
York Convention, which provides for the enforcement of foreign arbitral
awards, the Court granted Avco’s motion for summary judgment, refusing
144
enforcement. The Second Circuit affirmed, reasoning that Avco indeed had
been “unable to present its case” in contravention of Article V(1)(b) of the New
145
York Convention. In reaching this decision, the Second Circuit not only
evaluated the validity of the Tribunal’s award under the New York Convention,
but also interpreted Article IV(1) of the Tribunal’s constitutive document, the
146
Algiers Accords, which provides that the Tribunal’s awards are “final and
147
binding.”
136. Avco Corp. v. Iran Aircraft Indus., 19 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 200 (1988).
137. See Iran Aircraft Indus. v. Avco Corp., 980 F.2d 141, 143 (2d Cir. 1992).
138. See id.
139. See id. at 143-44.
140. Id. at 144.
141. Id. at 142.
142. Id. at 144.
143. See generally Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, June
10, 1958, 21 U.S.T. 2517, 330 U.N.T.S. 38.
144. Iran Aircraft Indus., 980 F.2d at 142.
145. See id. at 146.
146. The Algiers Accords are comprised of two Declarations, including: the Declaration of the
Government of the Democratic and Popular Republic of Algeria, U.S.-Iran, Jan. 19, 1981, 20 I.L.M 224,
reprinted in 1 C.T.R. 3; and the Declaration of the Democratic and Popular Republic of Algeria Concerning the
Settlement of Claims by the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Islamic
Republic of Iran, U.S.-Iran, Jan. 19, 1981, 20 I.L.M 230, reprinted in 1 C.T.R. 9 [hereinafter Claims Settlement
Declaration].
147. Claims Settlement Declaration, supra note 146, at art. IV(1); see Iran Aircraft Indus., 980 F.2d at
144-45 (The Second Circuit looked to the Tribunal’s interpretation of the provision and determined that the
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The Second Circuit’s decision, however, did not resolve the dispute. Rather,
Iran brought the matter back before the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal, filing
148
a claim against the United States for failing to enforce the award against Avco.
In 1998, the Tribunal ruled in favor of Iran, finding that the United States had
breached its obligation to ensure that the Tribunal’s awards are final and binding,
valid, and enforceable in the United States, and ordered the U.S. government to
149
pay the award.
In summary, while the U.S. District Court was given the task of interpreting
the powers of an international tribunal, that same tribunal was asked to decide
upon the legitimacy of the decision of a domestic court. These cases exemplify
the discrepancies and contradictions that can arise when today’s transnational
disputes force domestic and international courts reciprocally to recognize and
interpret the legitimacy of their decisions and their governing laws.
B. The ICJ and United States Death Penalty Cases
The next set of cases provides another stark illustration of the complexities
that can arise when domestic courts are required to apply the jurisprudence of
150
international courts and tribunals. To date, three countries—Paraguay,
151
152
Germany, and Mexico —have initiated proceedings against the United States
before the ICJ for breach of Article 36 of the Vienna Convention on Consular
153
Relations, a multilateral treaty to which the United States is a party. Article 36
requires authorities of states parties to inform arrested foreign nationals of their
154
right to contact their consular authorities “without delay.”

United States had no obligation to directly enforce the award, but only to provide a mechanism for enforcement
that is at least as favorable as that provided to parties seeking enforcement of other foreign arbitral awards. The
Second Circuit also dismissed Iran’s argument that the “final and binding” language of the Algiers Accords
requires that the award be treated as res judicata, and held that this language only means that the issues resolved
in the arbitration cannot be tried in court de novo.).
148. See Iran v. United States, Award No. 586-A27-FT (Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. June 5, 1998), reprinted in
34 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 39 (1998); see also CHRISTOPHER S. GIBSON & CHRISTOPHER R. DRAHOZAL, THE
IRAN-U.S. CLAIMS TRIBUNAL AT 25: THE CASES EVERYONE NEEDS TO KNOW FOR INVESTOR-STATE &
INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 167 n.5 (2007).
149. GIBSON & DRAHOZAL, supra note 148, at 167 n.5.
150. Vienna Convention on Consular Relations (Para. v. U.S.), 1998 I.C.J. 266 (Apr. 9).
151. LaGrand Case (Ger. v. U.S.), 2001 I.C.J. 104 (June 27).
152. Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mex. v. U.S.), 2004 I.C.J. 12 (Mar. 31).
153. Vienna Convention on Consular Relations art. 36(1), Apr. 24, 1963, 21 U.S.T. 77, 596 U.N.T.S.
261 [hereinafter Vienna Convention]. The ICJ has jurisdiction over disputes arising out of the interpretation and
application of the Convention, pursuant to the Optional Protocol Concerning the Compulsory Settlement of
Disputes, to which the United States was also a party. In March 2005, however, the United States withdrew
from the Convention’s Optional Protocol. See Frederic L. Kirgis, President Bush’s Determination Regarding
Mexican Nationals and Consular Convention Rights, AM. SOC’Y OF INT’L LAW (Mar. 2005),
http://www.asil.org/insights050309a.cfm.
154. Vienna Convention, supra note 153, at art. 36.
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Each case involved foreign nationals who had been sentenced to death by
U.S. courts. In what is perhaps the most well-known of these cases, the “Avena
Case,” Mexico claimed that U.S. authorities arrested, tried and sentenced to death
fifty-four of its nationals without advising them of their right to consular
155
assistance. In 2004, the ICJ issued its judgment on the merits in the case,
finding that the United States had violated Article 36(1) of the Vienna
Convention by failing to inform the fifty-four Mexican nationals of their
156
Convention rights (“Avena Judgement”). As a remedy, the Court required the
United States to provide the individuals with review and reconsideration of their
157
convictions.
In response to the Avena Judgement, President George W. Bush issued a
memorandum to the U.S. Attorney General stating that “the United States will
discharge its international obligations under [the Avena Judgement] by . . .
158
having State courts give effect to the decision.” In 2008, however, the U.S.
Supreme Court considered the President’s memorandum and the Avena
Judgement in the case of Medellín v. Texas, which involved one of the Mexican
159
nationals covered by the Avena Judgement. The Supreme Court held that
“neither Avena nor the President’s Memorandum constitutes directly enforceable
federal law that pre-empts state limitations on the filing of successive habeas
160
petitions.” The Court reasoned that although the United States is bound by the
ICJ’s decisions, the treaties could not be given effect as federal law absent
implementing legislation because the treaties at issue in the Avena case were not
161
self-executing.
Just five months after the Supreme Court’s decision, on August 5, 2008, and
despite provisional measures ordered by the ICJ to stay his death sentence,
162
Medellín was executed. The Medellín decision and its aftermath raise important

155. Avena and Other Mexican Nationals, Application Instituting Proceedings, ¶ 1 (Jan. 9, 2003),
available at http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/128/1913.pdf.
156. Avena and Other Mexican Nationals, Judgment, ¶ 153(4) (Mar. 2004), available at http://www.icjcij.org/docket/files/128/8188.pdf. With respect to three of the individuals who faced imminent execution, the
ICJ first issued a provisional measures order, calling upon the United States to “take all measures necessary to
ensure that [the individuals] are not executed pending final judgment in these proceedings.” Avena and Other
Mexican Nationals, Order of Provisional Measures, ¶ 59 (Mar. 2004), available at http://www.icjcij.org/docket/files/128/8180.pdf.
157. Avena and Other Mexican Nationals, Judgment, ¶ 153(9) (Mar. 2004) available at http://www.icjcij.org/docket/files/128/8188.pdf.
158. Margaret E. McGuiness, Medellín v. Texas: Supreme Court Holds ICJ Decisions under the
Consular Convention Not Binding Federal Law, Rejects Presidential Enforcement of ICJ Judgments over State
Proceedings, 12 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. INSIGHTS 6 (2008).
159. Medellín v. Texas, 128 S. Ct. 1346, 1353 (2008).
160. Id.
161. Id. at 1348.
162. Texas Executes Mexican Murderer, BBC NEWS (Aug. 6, 2008, 9:17 AM), http://news.bbc.co.uk/
2/hi/7542794.stm. In June 2008, Mexico filed a request for interpretation of the Avena Judgment, as well as for
provisional measures. On July 16, 2008, the ICJ issued an order requiring the United States to “take all
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questions regarding both the willingness and the ability of the United States to
comply with its international obligations, and highlight the ramifications of noncompliance. The decision generated considerable concern, among other things,
that other countries would similarly breach their obligations under the Vienna
163
Convention, putting Americans at risk abroad.
Yet, despite the negative ramifications that arose from Medellín, positive
indicators can be found. First, it is noteworthy that the Executive Branch did
attempt to compel state courts to comply with a decision of the ICJ. Furthermore,
prior to Medellín’s execution, the “Avena Case Implementation Act of 2008”
was introduced in the U.S. House of Representatives, a bill that, if passed, would
have empowered U.S. federal courts to hear the claim of a foreign national whose
164
right to consular notification was violated. These steps taken by the Executive
and Legislative branches in response to international demands suggest a
willingness on the part of the United States to honor international legal
commitments. One hopes that further lessons can be learned from the Medellín
case, and that the political will has grown for the United States to ensure its
compliance with the international rule of law.
C. The Chevron-Ecuador Lago Agrio Dispute
The storied dispute between Chevron and the government of Ecuador, which
has played out in numerous fora, both domestic and international, is perhaps the
most apt illustration of the growing interface, and often clash, between the
jurisprudence of international and domestic courts.
The dispute arose from the activities of an oil exploration and production
concession operated by the Texaco Petroleum Company (“TexPet”), later
165
acquired by Chevron, in the Ecuadorian Amazon, as part of a consortium.
TexPet’s partners in this endeavor included the government of Ecuador and its
166
state-owned oil company. In 1992, TexPet relinquished its interest in the
measures necessary to ensure” that Medellín would not be executed pending judgment on the request for
interpretation. See Request for the Interpretation of the Judgment of 31 March 2004 in the Case Concerning
Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mex. v. U.S.), Order of Provisional Measures, ¶ 80 (July 16, 2008),
available at http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/139/14639.pdf.
163. Sarah H. Lee, Strangers in a Strange Land: The Threat to Consular Rights of Americans Abroad
After Medellin v. Texas, 70 OHIO ST. L.J. 1519, 1544 (2009).
164. The bill was introduced into the House of Representatives by Rep. Howard Berman (D-CA). It was
referred to the House Committee on the Judiciary but was never enacted. See Avena Case Implementation Act
of 2008, H.R. 6481, 110th Cong. (2008), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/BILLS110hr6481ih/pdf/BILLS-110hr6481ih.pdf; H.R. 6481 (110th) Avena Case Implementation Act of 2008,
GOVTRACK.US, http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/110/hr6481 (last visited Nov. 25, 2012).
165. TexPet was a subsidiary of Texaco. In 2001, Chevron acquired Texaco and its subsidiaries. See
Chevron Corp. v. Ecuador, UNCITRAL, PCA Case No. 34877, Final Award 9 (Aug. 31, 2011); see also
Chevron Corp. v. Naranjo, 667 F.3d 232, 235 (2d Cir. 2012).
166. Ecuador’s State-owned oil company, the Corporación Estatal Petrolera Ecuatoriana (“CEPE”), was
replaced by the State-owned company PetroEcuador in 1989. See Ecuador, UNCITRAL, PCA Case No. 34877,
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consortium, and by 1998, pursuant to a settlement agreement, was released
from all liability for any environmental harm caused by the consortium’s
168
activities after completing designated remediation projects.
1. TexPet’s Breach of Contract Lawsuits and Related Arbitration Under the
United States-Ecuador BIT
Between 1991 and 1993, TexPet filed a number of lawsuits in Ecuadorian
169
courts, alleging breach of contract in relation to the consortium’s activities. The
lawsuits lingered without resolution in the Ecuadorian court system for some
fifteen years. Consequently, in 2006, Chevron, having acquired TexPet’s interest,
sought resolution of its cases in an international forum, commencing arbitration
proceedings against Ecuador in The Hague under the United States-Ecuador
170
BIT.
The international arbitral tribunal was confronted, inter alia, with the
question of whether Ecuador violated both domestic and international law as a
171
result of undue delay in deciding the lawsuits. Ultimately, the tribunal found
that Ecuador had breached Article II(7) of the BIT, which provides that states
parties must “provide effective means of asserting claims and enforcing rights
with respect to investment,” and awarded Chevron roughly $100 million in
172
damages. In the wake of that award Ecuador has commenced proceedings
under the same BIT against the United States, alleging a dispute between the two
over the correct “interpretation and application” of the very same Article of their
173
BIT.
2. Aguinda Class Action in United States District Court
Meanwhile in 1993, indigenous residents of the Ecuadorian Amazon
commenced a class action lawsuit against Texaco in the U.S. District Court for

¶¶ 208-209.
167. See Aguinda v. Texaco, Inc., 303 F.3d 470, 473 (2d Cir. 2002).
168. Chevron Corp. v. Donziger, 768 F. Supp. 2d 581, 598 (S.D.N.Y. 2011).
169. Ecuador, UNCITRAL, PCA Case No. 34877, ¶ 217.
170. See id. ¶ 228; see generally Treaty between the United States of America and the Republic of
Ecuador Concerning the Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Investment, U.S.-Ecuador, Aug. 27,
1993, S. Treaty Doc. No. 103-15 (entered into force May 11, 1997) [hereinafter U.S.-Ecuador BIT].
171. Ecuador, UNCITRAL, PCA Case No. 34877, ¶ 35.
172. Id. ¶¶ 141-42; see U.S.-Ecuador BIT, supra note 170, at art. II, ¶ 7.
173. The Republic of Ecuador v. The United States of America, PERMANENT COURT OF ARBITRATION,
http://www.pca-cpa.org/showpage.asp?pag_id=1455 (last visited Nov. 25, 2012). However, the tribunal in this
case notified the parties that it would be dismissing the case for lack of jurisdiction, with reasons to follow. See
Luke Eric Peterson, United States Defeats Ecuador’s State-to-State Arbitration; Will Outcome Dissuade
Argentine Copycat Case?, INV. ARBITRATION REPORTER (Oct. 3, 2012), http://www.iareporter.com/
articles/20120903_3/print.
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the Southern District of New York, seeking compensation for alleged
environmental contamination to the rivers and rain forests of the region caused
174
by TexPet’s oil operations between 1964 and 1992. Texaco sought dismissal of
the case on forum non conveniens grounds, arguing that Ecuador was an adequate
175
and appropriate alternative forum. The District Court ultimately ruled in
176
Texaco’s favor, and the Second Circuit affirmed the decision, but not before
177
securing Texaco’s consent to the jurisdiction of Ecuadorian courts.
3. Lago Agrio Action in Ecuadorian Court
Having lost their battle in U.S. District Court, residents of Ecuador’s
Amazon rainforest filed a new lawsuit against Chevron and Texaco in 2003—this
178
time before a court closer to home, in Lago Agrio, Ecuador. After an eight-year
legal battle, on February 14, 2011, the Ecuadorian court found that Texaco had
“caused extensive damage to the environment, peoples, and indigenous cultures
in Ecuador in violation of Ecuadorian law,” and awarded the Lago Agrio
179
plaintiffs over $18 billion in damages (“Lago Agrio Judgment”).
In the meantime, while the Lago Agrio proceeding was still pending,
Chevron took preemptive action in two fora outside of Ecuador to counter a
potential judgment against it.
4. Second Arbitration Under United States-Ecuador BIT and RICO Suit
First, in 2009, Chevron initiated a second BIT arbitration against Ecuador in
The Hague. In this proceeding, the international arbitral tribunal was asked to
adjudge Chevron’s claim that “Ecuador’s judicial branch has conducted the Lago
180
Agrio Litigation in total disregard” of domestic and international law. Chevron
requested money damages and equitable relief, including an award requiring

174. See Aguinda, 303 F.3d at 473.
175. Chevron Corp., 768 F. Supp. 2d at 598. Note that Texaco also argued for the dismissal of the case
on the grounds of “failure to join the Republic of Ecuador and Petroecuador, which . . . were indispensable
because (1) the requested equitable relief within Ecuador could not otherwise be ordered, and (2)
Petroecuador’s own actions would be at issue in the case.” Id.
176. See Aguinda, 303 F.3d at 476.
177. See id. at 480; see also Naranjo, 667 F.3d at 235.
178. Chevron Corp., 768 F. Supp. 2d at 600.
179. See id. at 620-21. The decision was affirmed by the Ecuadorian Court of Appeals, and Chevron
subsequently sought further review before Ecuador’s National Court of Justice. See Chevron Corp. v. Texaco,
UNCITRAL, PCA Case No. 2009-23, First Interim Award on Interim Measures, 13 (Jan. 25, 2012); Press
Release, Chevron, Chevron Appeals Illegitimate Ruling in Ecuador (Jan. 20, 2012), http://www.chevron.com/
chevron/pressreleases/article/01202012_chevronappealsillegitimaterulinginecuador.news.
180. Texaco, UNCITRAL, PCA Case No. 2009-23, Claimant’s Notice of Arbitration, ¶ 4 (Sept. 23,
2009).
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Ecuador to indemnify Chevron for any potential damages against it awarded by
181
the Ecuadorian court.
Secondly, on February 1, 2011, just prior to the Lago Agrio Judgment,
Chevron commenced proceedings in the U.S. District Court for the Southern
District of New York against, among others, the Lago Agrio plaintiffs and their
182
lawyers. Chevron’s complaint included allegations that the plaintiffs’ lawyers
engaged in a criminal enterprise to obtain a judgment against Chevron in the
Ecuadorian court or a settlement through unlawful means, including fraud and
extortion, in violation of the Racketeering Influenced and Corrupt Organizations
183
Act (“RICO”). Chevron sought, among other things, a preliminary injunction
barring enforcement of a potential judgment in the Ecuadorian courts against
184
Chevron anywhere in the world outside of Ecuador.
On February 8, 2011, the District Court issued a temporary restraining order
185
against enforcement outside Ecuador of any adverse Ecuadorian judgment. The
following day, the international arbitral tribunal, noting the District Court’s
temporary restraining order, issued its own order directing Ecuador “to take all
measures at its disposal to suspend or cause to be suspended the enforcement or
recognition within and without Ecuador of any judgement against [Chevron] in
the Lago Agrio Case . . . pending further order or award in these arbitration
186
proceedings . . .” (“February 9, 2011 Order”).
In March 2011, noting the Lago Agrio Judgment, as well as the international
arbitral tribunal’s February 9, 2011 Order, the District Court for the Southern
187
District of New York granted Chevron’s request for a preliminary injunction.
The Court concluded, among other things, that the Ecuadorian judicial system
lacks impartiality and integrity and that there was “ample evidence of fraud in the
188
Ecuadorian proceedings.” Shortly thereafter, the Court of Appeals for the

181. Id. ¶ 76.
182. Chevron Corp., 768 F. Supp. 2d at 625.
183. Id.
184. Id. at 625-26; see also Naranjo, 667 F.3d at 238. The District Court severed the claim for a
declaratory judgment from the other claims on April 15, 2011. See Chevron Corp. v. Donziger, 800 F. Supp. 2d
484 (S.D.N.Y. 2011).
185. Chevron Corp., 768 F. Supp. 2d at 626.
186. See Texaco, UNCITRAL, PCA Case No. 2009-23, Order for Interim Measures, 11 (Feb. 9, 2011).
Most recently, on January 25, 2012, after the Ecuadorian court of appeal dismissed Chevron’s appeal against
the Lago Agrio Judgment, the international arbitral panel reissued the order against enforcement that it had
granted as an interim award. See Texaco, UNCITRAL, PCA Case No. 2009-23, First Interim Award on Interim
Measures, 16 (Jan. 25, 2012). On February 16, 2012, the Tribunal issued a Second Interim Award on Interim
Measures, and on February 27, 2012, the Tribunal issued a Third Interim Award on Jurisdiction and
Admissibility. See Texaco, UNCITRAL, PCA Case No. 2009-23, Second Interim Award on Interim Measures
(Feb. 16, 2012); see also Texaco, UNCITRAL, PCA Case No. 2009-23, Third Interim Award on Jurisdiction
and Admissibility (Feb. 27, 2012).
187. Chevron Corp., 768 F. Supp. 2d at 660.
188. Id. at 633-34, 636.
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189

Second Circuit vacated the injunction, finding that challenges to the validity of
190
a foreign judgment can occur only after enforcement of the judgment is sought.
The Court cited considerations of international comity, stating that “[t]he court
presuming to issue such an injunction sets itself up as the definitive international
arbiter of the fairness and integrity of the world’s legal systems” and that such a
court “risks disrespecting the legal system not only of the country in which the
judgment was issued, but also those of other countries, who are inherently
assumed insufficiently trustworthy to recognize what is asserted to be the
191
extreme incapacity of the legal system from which it emanates.”
5. Petition Before the Inter-American Commission for Human Rights
To complicate matters further, on February 9, 2012, the Lago Agrio plaintiffs
filed a petition before the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights for
192
precautionary measures under Article 25 of its Rules of Procedure. The
plaintiffs claimed that the relief sought by Chevron before the arbitral tribunal
threatened the plaintiffs’ rights under the American Convention for Human
Rights, and in particular, the rights to life, physical integrity, health, a fair trial,
193
judicial protection, and equal treatment under the law. They asked the
Commission to “call for precautionary measures from [Ecuador] sufficient to
assure that [it] will refrain from taking any action that would contravene,
194
undermine, or threaten” their rights. Shortly thereafter, on March 2, 2012, the
Lago Agrio plaintiffs withdrew the petition, stating that precautionary measures
were no longer warranted in light of a judgment of the Ecuadorian court of
appeal, which found that Ecuadorian courts could not give effect to the arbitral
195
tribunal’s order. The court reasoned that no legal mechanism existed which
would allow it to suspend the recognition or enforcement of the Lago Agrio
196
judgment. Although the court “affirm[ed] Ecuador’s commitment to its
189. Naranjo, 667 F.3d at 234, 247.
190. Id. at 241, 247.
191. Id. at 243-44. Since that decision, however, the Lago Agrio plaintiffs reportedly have commenced
proceedings to enforce their judgment in Canada and Brazil. Fred W., Ecuador Commences Actions in Canada
and Brazil to Enforce 18 Billion Judgment Against Chevron, CATHARSIS OURS BLOG (June 30, 2012),
http://fredw-catharsisours.blogspot.com/2012/06/ecuador-commences-actions-in-canada-and.html.
192. Letter from Pablo Fajardo et al., Plaintiffs’ Legal Representatives, Calle Eloy Alfaro y Progreso
Nueva Loja—Sucumbíos, and Aaron Marr Page, Counsel, Forum Nobis PLLC, to Dr. Santiago Canton,
Executive Secretary, Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (Feb. 9, 2012), available at
http://www.nd.edu/~ndlaw/faculty/cassel/IACHR-PM-request.pdf.
193. Id.
194. Id.
195. Letter from Pablo Fajardo et al., Plaintiffs’ Legal Representatives, Calle Eloy Alfaro y Progreso
Nueva Loja—Sucumbíos, and Aaron Marr Page, Counsel, Forum Nobis PLLC, to Dr. Santiago Canton,
Executive Secretary, Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (Mar. 2, 2012), available at
http://lettersblogatory.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/03/OAS-response.pdf.
196. Id.
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international obligations both in investment matters and in human rights
matters,” it held that when a conflict arises between the two obligations, human
197
rights obligations take precedence.
In summary, we have on the playing field: (i) a judgment from an
international arbitral tribunal against Ecuador awarding Chevron $100 million;
(ii) an award in Ecuadorian courts against Chevron awarding the Lago Agrio
plaintiffs over $18 billion; (iii) two pending matters—one before an international
arbitral tribunal and another before the U.S. courts—in which Chevron has
alleged that the Lago Agrio litigation was conducted in violation of both
domestic and international law; and (iv) a petition filed by the Lago Agrio
plaintiffs against Ecuador before a human rights commission, which was
subsequently withdrawn. Evidence has shown that with regard to the two pending
proceedings, both U.S. domestic courts and the international arbitral tribunals are
willing to recognize the acts of the other. Only time will tell whether this trend
will continue, or whether we will be forced to deal with conflicting decisions and
next determine how they can be resolved, if ever.
V. CONCLUSION
Ultimately, taking into consideration the underlying tension and the explicit
conflicts that arise between international and domestic institutions and within
international law, it may be concluded that when international institutions and
practitioners are working at their highest caliber, and when domestic societies
and governments are receptive to, or at the very least, recognize the force of
international law, justice, both domestic and international, may be achieved. As
can be seen from the foregoing, however, such a result cannot be guaranteed in
any specific case, and in any event there will be problems to overcome.

197. Id. The appellate court reconfirmed its ruling in a subsequent decision. See id.

32

